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Nature of the case
Plairirltf brought an action for specific performance to acquire
the f.e·-ii··. Rar.ch.

He claimed prior to trial that there was an agree-

ment which cnntained an Option and which Option he exercised.
Plaintiff claimed that there was no agreement but merely an outstanding counteroffer which the Plaintiff never accepted.
Disposition of the Lower Court
This case was heard before Honorable J. Harlan Burns, District
Judge of the Fifth Judicial District in and for Washington County,
State of Utah, who impaneled an advisory jury, adopted the jury's
answers to Special Intercogatories and granted a Judgment and
Decree of Specific Performance.
Relief Sought on Appeal
Defendant Lewis seeks a reversal of the Judgment and Decree
or, in the alternative, a Decision of this Court granting Defendant
a New Trial.

Statement of the Facts
A written Option Agreement was prepared for Plaintiff- Responr
Trees by a St. George attorney, Steven Snow.

Attorney Snow signed

the agreemer.t as "Attorney in Fact" for plaintiff Trees after whid
it wes presented by

d

real estate agGnt, Michael Hatch, to Defendar

Appellant Lewis st the Chicago Airport on December 4, 1980, about

1

year before Defendant Lewis expected to retire and return to Utah
to live.

Hatch worked for Deseret Realty which was owned by Real

Estate Agent, Earl Milne and his wife.

The Option Agreement perta'

to the purchase and sale of the 160 acre Lewis Ranch which abuts
Zion National Park near Springdale, Utah.
The ranch is in a basically non-accessible area but has therec
an hist:Jrical old home known es the Shunesbe::g Mansion, a res;_denc;
a guest house, a small lake, a swimming pool, with water rights anc
although basically non-productive was a refuge for Defendant Lewis
who spent his summer and often his Christmas vacations there as
well as visiting on other occasions and who looked forward to his
retirement so that he could use and enjoy the ranch.

He acquired

it after the death of his brother who owned it and lived there for
many years.

Lewis did not desire to sell the ranch having turned

down several offers and not having ever listed it for sale.

His

wife had some physical health problems and since there was no phon<
or electricity at the Rach, he did not like to leave her there alor
He had a lot in Springdale on which he intended to build a home.
never at any time set a purchase price, the price in this instance
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having been one offered by the Plaintiff.

James F. Trees, who

resided in New York, contacted real estate agent, Earl Milne,
described
nver the

~het
le11i~

tvpe of property he was interested in finding; flew
ranch and other property in the area and hired Milne

and/or his compHny to acquire property or options on property, and
Trees agreed to pay all real estate fees in connection with any
purchase.

Agent Milne contacted Lewis who made it clear to Milne

and to plaintiff Trees that Lewis did not desire to sell the
ranch.

Lewis had several conditions primary of which was retaining

60-day visitation rights in the summer and other visitation rights
to hike and move about the ranch.

He desired that the buyer be a

person with whom he could have a good relationship so that he could
enjoy his visitation rights, monitor projects which were going on,
mal-.e a contribution to the overall condition of the ranch and
preservation of the area and the historical

backgro~nd

and history

of the ranch, and that the buyer be willing to make a gift or
donation to BYU.
Trees visited BYU to see if he approved of the school, which
he did.

Efforts were made with BYU to handle the transaction so

that BYU would obtain part of the sales price as a gift or donation
but that ef:ort failed because of tax law complications.
The Option Agreement contained, inter alia, two important
provisions, both of which are found in paragraph 12 of the Agreement:

i:. (First) This document is intended as the final and exclusive
agreement of the parties, and all other agreements related
to this property, between these parties are superseded
hereby and merged herein. (Second) This document may not
be amended, modified or revoked unless by a writing signed
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by the parti..es.
(The words "First" and ''Second" have
been added for purposes of emphasis)
The Option Agreement, Exhibi.t 5 and entitled ''Real Estate
Option" made no mention whatsoever of App!?llant Lewis' retained
Yisitati.on r:!6hts, and Lewis was appalh•d when he ft)und no ment
of visitation rights in the Option

Agreem~nt,

particularly in i

of the exclusion e.nd m1!rger clause set forth in pare graph 12.
had little experience :'..n land transactions, and none with 0ptior
However, he di.d refuse to !:ign until there was added to the bott
of the Option Agreement the follow!'.ng:
Additionally, it is understood that there exists an
agreement between optionee and optionor for mutually
agreeable visitation rights for optionor.
Further, paragraph 9 was amended relative to the prepe.yment pen1
.clause.

After these changes were penned in, at the airport, on:

then did Lewis sign the Option Agreement.
At this point, the Option Agreement becamt! a "Counteroffer'
and will be referred to as such hereafter, except as otherwise
noted.

The Counteroffer was never accepted in writing as requi1

by paragraph 12 (or otherwise) by either Attorney in Fact Snow

1

the Plaintiff, Trees.
The Counteroffer was signed by Lewis on the 4th day of
December, 1980.

Thirteen days later on December 17, 1980, Lew:

drafted an "AGREEMENT" between himself and Trees which provided

1
t

t

w

A

d.

that there was an agreement between the parties wherein Lewis
retains certain visitation rights for the

remainde~

of his life

which includes 60-days annual "in residence" at the ranch and
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t

r:i

the opJ.Hirtun i ty to vis it, move, ride, hike, and moniter projects on
che property at: other times.

Lewis signed the Agreement (Exhibit 14)

and o>ent ic t.•.' Agent Hatch, together with a covering letter (Exhibit

d

15) requesting Hatch to have Trees sign the Agreement and

:

retu~n

a

signed copy to him.

v'

The Counteroffer required the option set forth therein to be
exercised on or before December 31, 1980.

or

ti

Because of problems

Trees was having with regard to the purchase by him of DeMille
property which abutted a part of the Lewis ranch, Trees, through
Attorney Snow asked for and received extensions of time to and
including the 30th day of May, 1981, in which to exercise the
Counteroffer.
On or about the 27th of May, 1981, Lewis was informed by Trees
that he was exercising his option to purchase the ranch.

r'

11

When

Lewis asked about his visitation rights, and told Trees he had no
option until Lewis received his write-up on his visitation rights,
Trees replied that Lewis had no visitation rights, no 60-day visitation rights, and that Trees did not have any information about
them.

Whereupon Lewis told him to call Hatch.

would and that he would call Lewis back.

Trees said that he

Trees immediately contacted

Attorney Snow and for the first time became aware of the agreement
~:

dated December 17, Plaintiff's Exhibit 15.

On May 29, Trees sent a

letter to Lewis which had been dictated to Trees by Attorney Snow
which stated:

"In accordance with the terms of our contract and

the exten8ions thereof, I hereby exercise my option to purchase
T:he

~Jroperty

in Utah . . . . "

The letter does not mention the
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December 17th Agreement nor does it mer:tion visitation rights at a
Approximately fourteen days later, following Lewis' consultat
with an attorney, the attorney for Lewis delivered a letter dated
June 12, 1981, to attorney Snow withdrawing the Counteroffer and
stating that the parties were not in agreement.

Exhibits 16, a

handwritten letter, and 49, a typed copy of the handwritten letter
During the next ten days, Trees had Milne present to Lewis
a letter form agreement,and an Agreement, both signed by Snow as
Attorney in Fact for Trees, one dated June 19, 1981, the other
dated June 23, 1981.

The letter agreement extended some visitatic

privileges which consisted of an invitation to Lewis as a friend c
Trees and based upon guest privileges to visit and temporarily
remain as a guest on the property, provided Trees or other guests
were not on the property and further provided that arrangements
must be made and approved by Trees prior to any visit; it did not
bind his heirs and assigns.

The Agreement of June 23 acknowledgei

that Lewis had certain visitation rights but limited them to hike
or ride horseback through the property, subject to receiving permi
in advance for each visit, but did not provide for any in-residenc
of any kind.

These letters are designated Exhibits 28 and 29,

respectively, both of which were excluded by the Coui:t at trial
offers of settlement.

a1

Trees did not sign either of them either

letter although each contained a line for his signature.

Notwit;

standing the foregoing, Trees testified at trial that he had
always been willing to grant the visitation set forth by Lewis,
including the specific visitation set forth in the December 17

A 11 f'BY'Il<""t s tendered by Trees had been by check and none were

cashRd and all checks were returned immediately following the

withdrawal of the Counteroffer.
want checks sent to him!

Lewis told Snow that he did not

Finally Snow honored Lewis' request and

stopped sending checks.
This case was tried with an advisory jury with the Court
adopting the Findings or Verdict of the jury.
Additional Facts are hereafter set forth.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE COUNTEROFFER WAS
NEVER ACCEPTED.
The Jury found that the document entitled Real Estate Option
dated November 5, 1980, as amended before signing by Lewis to
provide for visitation rights together with the December 17 Agreement
which spelled out the visitation rights constituted a Counteroffer.
Trees rejected that Counteroffer.

The Counteroffer had to be signed

by Trees as required by the Option in paragraph 12.

Neither the

Option of December 5 as amended nor the December 17th Agreement was
signed by Trees or his attorney in fact Snow.

In addition, in the

tPlephone conversation on May 27 when Trees said he was exercising
his •)ption he testified, T. Vol I, p. 171"
. And then he (Lewis) blurted out, "Where are the rights
for my 60-day rights?" And I didn't know anything about his
60-day rights.
And I said, "Walter, you have no rights, 60day rights.
What are you talking about?" And he .;aid, "You

call Mike Hatch, he knows." And I said, "Okay, I'll call
Mike Hatch and then he'll call you right back or I'll call
you right back. That was the conversation basically.
Trees thought to himself "Oh my God, Walter is overreaching."
Neither Trees nor Hatch ever called changing the

rej1~ction

of the

Counteroffer.
The power cf acceptance created by an offer or counteroffer !
terminated by communicated rejection of

t~e

offer, and it makes nc

difference that a time period has been given for accepting the
offer or counteroffer or that the offer or counteroffer requires
acceptance thereof in writing.
389 (1963).

I Corbin, Contracts, Sec. 94. P.

Trautwein v. Leavy, 472 P.2d 776 (Wyo.)

(1970)

Having lost the power to accept, the Plaintiff no longer had
power to accept and could not accept thereafter in the absence of
Lewis again reaffirming the offer, which he did not do.

Although

he probably would have done so prior to withdrawing the counterof
provided Trees had signed and de livered to him a copy of the Decer
17 Agreement, T. Vol 1, p. 107.
Trees knew of the residency requirement prerequisite insiste'
on by Lewis in all negotiations.

Even though he had not seen the

December 17th Agreement when he rejected the counteroffer, he kne1
of the residency requirement as he had received a letter dated
December 6, 1980, the day after the counteroffer was made by Lewi
addressed to the Superintendant of Zions National Park wherein
Lewis pointed out that he was going to maintain some involvement
and part time residency in the ranch during his life time.
12.

Exhib

Further, he had ample time to change his rejection if he

r1£s ired v> d•) so.

He did not.

On May 29, he wrote a letter to

T,ewis whPrein he srated, "In accordance with the terms of our
cunt oict and extent ions thereof I hereby exercise my option to
purchase the property in Utah."

Attorney Snow dictated that letter.

He undoubtedly knew that matters dealing with rights in land had to
b"' in writing in order to comply with our Statute of Frauds Title
25 Chapter 5 Utah Code Annotated 1953, an amended, and that the
reservation of rights in the ranch for visitation purposes required
compliance with Chapter 5 and particularly Section 1.

There was no

other collateral visitation document in writing supporting the December 17 Agreement until the June 19 and June 23 Agreement which
which were after the time of the withdrawal of the Counteroffer.
The case of R. J. Daum Const. Co. v. Child 247 P2d 17, (Utah)
(1952), recognizes that the Plaintiff in a Specific Performance
case has the burden of proof and that a reply or offer perporting
to accept an offer but which adds a qualification or requires
performance of conditions is not an acceptance but a Counteroffer.
Further, in the case of Specific Performance, the burden of
proof on the Plaintiff is strong.

This ls pointed out in the case

of Pitcher vs. Lauritzen, 423 P2d 491 (Utah) (1967), wherein this
Court approvingly cites the 1946 Colorado Case of Bowman vs. Reyburn,
170 P2d 271

where it is said by a unanimous Court at page 276 as follow!

In an action for Specific Performance, a contract
must be free from ambiguity and it must be clearly
es~.ablished that the demand and performance is in accordance with the actual agreement of the parties (Citations
•1mi L Led), 'a greater degree of certainty ls required in the
terms of an agreement, which is to be specifically executed in
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equity, than is necessary in a contract which is to be the
basis of an action at law for dnma~es', Porneroys Specific
Performance of Contracts, 3d Ed., ~159, in Ward vs. Ward, 94
Co. 275 30 Pd 853, also in Mestas vs. Martinr-;--113 Col. 108,
155 Pd 161. ' There i.s no better estabished principle of
equity jnrisprudence than that Specific: Performance will not
be decreed whE·n the contract is imcomplete, uncertain or
indefina.te.'
Dodg~_Jl_:ros. vs. Williams Estate Co., 52 Nev. 36
287 p 282, 28~ ..... .
It would seem to fellow that in this case of a Counteroffer.

This

burden fell on the Plaintiff, in view of the foregoing, to spell
cut in his May 29 letter that he was accepting the Counteroffer, o
that he was accepting the "Contract" as amended by Lewis and as
amended by the December 17 Agreement.

For, in fact, there was no

"Contract" only an outstanding Counteroffer.

The letter assumes a

"Contract" and does not accept a Countercf fer but states I hereby
exercise my option".

It assumes a contract existed.

Further,

the silence of Trees left his oral rejection of the counteroffer
very much in effect, for silence is not to be deemed an acceptance
Kimball Elevator Co. vs. elevator Supplies Co., 272 P2d 583 (Utah)
(1954).
The Plaintiff had the burden of proof in this case which he d
not sustain.

Also, the Option Agreement of December 4 was drawn b

Attorney Snow and signed by him as attorney-in-fact and he dictate
the May 29 Agreement, and to t'l-.at extent he is "a pa::-ty" to the
documents; he had knowledge of the December 17 Agreement shortly
after its signing by Lewis.

An instrument is to be construed

against the person that draws it, and this is particularly true
where the attorney is a party.

It is submitted that the same is

basically true where the attorney is the attorney-in-fact as well
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as the attorney for the individual for whom he draws documents, and
the same should be construed against him and his client.

Continental

Bank and Trust Co. vs. Bybee, 306 Specific Second 773 (Utah) (1957).
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO MEETING OF THE
MINDS BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
It is obvious from the foregoing argument in Point I that
there was inter alia no meeting of the minds between Lewis and
Trees.

That conclusion is further supported by the Agreement of June

19 and June 23 signed by his attorney-in-fact relating to visitation
provisions.

As noted, the June 19 letter agreement was an "invitation"

"based on friendship" and offered as "privileges" to Lewis and his
immediate f.amily.

The Agreement of June 23 reads as follows:
AGREEMENT

During his lifetime, Walter Lewis shall retain certain
visitation rights to hike or horseback ride through the
property.
Mr. Lewis shall have the right to invite a few of his
close friends or family members to accompany him.
Mr. Lewis shall notify Mr. Trees or his foreman concerning these visits and shall receive permission in advance
for each visit.
This agreement shall be ~inding on the heirs, assigns,
and successors in interest of James F. Trees.
DATED this 23rd day of June, 1981.
It provides for no residency, 60-day or otherwise.
advance permission.

It requires

However, the rights retained by Lewis in his

December 17 Agreement are specific and clear:
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AGREEMENT
As part of the contract for sale of certain properties
by Walter M. Lewis to James F. Trees, there exists an agreea
between the parties that Lew~s retains certain visitation
rig'."its during the remainder of his 1.i.fe, end may invite fami!
and friends to accompany him. These rights include:
60 days annually :Jf ''in rt,sidence' at the ranch
house, the dates to be arranged by each party endeavoring to min;.mally inconvenience the other.
The opportunity to visit or move through the prope1
ties at other times to ride or hike to remote points
ot to monitor projects, provided that precaution is
always taken not to invade the pri·..racy of Trees.
This agreement is binding on the heirs, executors, administri
successors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto.
This agreement recognizes what gentlemen would and ought to do in
close situation as was contemplated by the parties in that in-res'
provision required that "each party endeavoring to minimally incor
venience the other."

It does not say a party shall not or cannot

but is consistant with the language that they endeavor not to
interfer.

It is somewhat stronger with regard to other visitaitor

in that "precaution" is to be taken not to invade the privacy of
Trees.

Again this is what gentlemen or neighbors with good feeU

toward each other would do, but here again it is not a prohabitim
and it does not require first obtaining the consent of Trees or h
foreman.

Clearly the parties have said different things, and the·

was no mutual consent or meeting of the minds on this very essent
element or term as required to form a binding contract.

17 Am Ju

2d, Contracts §18, p. 354.

POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE TWO REQUESTED INSTRUCTION

RELATIVE TO THE REJECTION OF AN OFFER, AND IN FAILING TO GIVE
iZEQl!r'STED TNSTRlJCTIONS RELATIVE TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
The following two requested instructions by Lewis were refused and
not given by the Court to the Jury:
The power of acceptance created by an of fer or counteroffer is terminated by a communicated rejection. This is true
even though a definite time was given by the offeror for considering his offer or counteroffer and the rejection is made
before that time is expired. Likewise, this is true regardless
of whether the of fer or counteroffer requires or does not
require the acceptance to be made in writing. R. Vol II p. 256.
and
An offer or counteroffer once rejected is not subject to
being accepted at a later date in the absence of the offer or
counteroffer being renewed by the party making the same.
R. Vol II p. 260.
The law which Trees relied upon is already set forth above at page
8 namely, Corbin on Contracts and the case of Treautwein vs. Leavy.
Had these instructions been given, the jury would have had a basis
to find that the Plaintiff had rejected the Counteroffer as argued
in Point I.

Such a finding would have eliminated any question for

the jury relative to the May 29 letter.
the failure to give this instruction.

Lewis was prejudiced by
There could be no finding of

the jury on this point since it was not submitted by the Court, and
it can be assumed that the Court did not concur with the instruction
or the law supporting it since the failure to give this instruction
was raised in the MOTION FOR JUDGMENT FOR THE DEFENDANT, R. Vol. 3
P. 196, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, R. Vol. 3 P. 264 and
4FFIDAVIT attached thereto and DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, R. Vol. 3 p. 107.
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The Requested Instruction relative to the Statute of Frauds
An agreement pertaining to lane or an interest in land
required to be in writing.
If such agreement is not in writ
it is void and of no force and effect.
Statute of Frauds, U
Code Annotated, Chapter 5 Title 25. R. Vol II 274 and 288.
Under the terms of the Option Agreement, a Warranty Deed wai
required to be delivered transferring title of the Ranch in feet
Trees.
(title).

As noted elsewhere, Trees did not want a cloud on his dee
However, Lewis was entitled to have "declared" his reta

interest in the Ranch in written form, otherwise the Statute of
Frauds would have prevented him from making any successful claim
to his retained visitation rights, and the jury was entitled to s
know, and question the motives of the Plaintiff and his position
there was a mutual oral agreement for visitation rights.

Oral

visitation rights gave the plaintiff many advantages.
The giving of each of these instructions could and would hav·
resulted in the jury finding for Lewis.

The errors are prejudici

Webb vs. Snow 132 P.2d 114, 102 Utah 435.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING AS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE THE AGREEM
OF JUNE 19 and JUNE 23.
The two Agreements signed by Snow as attorney-in-fact were a
admitted into evidence because of the objection that they were
offers of compromise.

T Vol. II, commencing page 339.

Before th

objection in ruling, Trees had testified that he had always been
willing to accept the Agreement of December 17.

These letters we

in direct contradiction to that statement and position.

They wer

signed by his attorney-in-fact and he was bound by them and he di
not claim that they did not represent his point of view.

_,

/,

~

There i

nothi11g in these Agreements which indicate that they are offers in
Lumpronn:;,: tiley ,-,f,r"k fo1- themselves what Trees was willing to give
tc LPwL b,-

,,,~-;

nf -visitation.

They represent the very tools of

cross examination and the purpose of cross examination in finding
uul

the tn1th by pointing out the inconsistancies in prior statements

of a witness a!ld generally impeach him.
POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE SURPRISE WAIVER OF ATTORNEYCLIENT RELATIONSHIP AND ALLOWING ATTORNEY SNOW TO TESTIFY AS TO
INTENTION OF LETTER OF :1AY 29.
On the second day of trial the Court permitted over the objection
of Lewis, to permit the Plaintiff to waive his client-attorney
relationship with Snow, so as to permit Snow to testify as to the
intention of Trees and Snow relative to the May 29 letter in which
Trees exercises his option under the contract.

This action came as

a complete surprise to Lewis who had not prepared for trial on
that basis.

The large record, transcript and numerous and long

Depositions primarily resulted from the position taken by the
Plaintiff that there was a contract and the option therein was
exerc-ised by the letter of May 29, 1981, and the attempt by Defendant
Lewis to determine how and in what manner the contract came about,
how and in ,ihat manner the option came about, and how and in what
manner the> cldirned option was exercised.

The position of Lewis was

alwavr; cle3r that there was a Counteroffer which was never accepted.
Tc

'-''3:~

,:ut until rrial that the Defendant really acknowledged the
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existance of a Counteroffer, and the claimed acceptance thereof.
The COMPLAINT filed by Snow on July 29, 1981, makes no reference
to a Counteroffer although the position of Lewis that a Countercf1
had been made and withdrawn had been known to him in writing sine<
June 12, 1981.

The FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT filed by a new at tom

on April 30, 1982, contained fourteen counts and eighty-four para1
all of which deal only with the December 4th option and none of wl
makes reference of any kind to the December 17th Agreement.

Only

four paragraphs deal with the question of a Counterclaim and they
are grudgingly conditional and read as follows:
57. That in the event Defendant's position obtained on advise from counsel that he had made a
counteroffer is sustained, knowledge of such a position was
conveyed only as of June 12, 1981.
58.
offer;

That even were the option dealt with as a counter·

(A)
Plaintiff's failure to give reasonable, or for
that matter any, notice of his rejection cf the same shortly
after its execution on December 4, 1980 (Exhibit A) acts as
an acceptance of the so-called counteroffer; indeed Plaintifl
adopted a course of behavior indicating assent to such
modification; and/or
(B) Plaintiff at all times did accept the so called
counteroffer; and/or
(C)
Plaintiff was, upon notific3tion of Defendant's
election to designate the option as a counteroffer, not giver
reasonable notice or indeed any notice or opportunity, to
accept or reject the same.
5g, Whether designated as an option or a counteroffer,
Plaintiff has been and is ready, willing, and able to perfov
his portion of the parties' agreement.
Interrogatories were sent to Trees requesting in Interrogatory
No. 15:

"Please state all of the facts which you claim to support
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tliP

3]

I' .~H Lon:'

tP'r Lfy

1n

:·, ,.

to p:nagraph 58 B; designate each witness who will
•.-t

•)l each w Ltness

l hc-re0f and state the substance of the testimony

ThE: Answer sets forth no facts but merely states

that the Plaintiff will rely upon the Depositions of Trees, Snow,
Lewis and Milne together with a check.
and mailed

De~ember

These Answers were filed

1, 1982, approximately two months before trial

whi_ch commenced on February 9, 1983.

In an almost identical request

with regard to paragraph 59, the Plaintiff responded substantially
the same way but referred to the facts set forth in Plaintiff's PreTrial submitted to the Court on November 12, 1982.
8.

R Vol. 2 pg 7

&

An Affidavit of the Plaintiff also filed November 12, sets that

he has read the facts set forth in the Pre-Trial wherein he
acknowledged having read the proposed pre-trial order and "to my
satisfaction these are the facts in the case and I subscribe under
oath to them." R Vol

l p. 230.

The proposed Pre-Trial Order

referred to is found commencing on P. 235 of the same volume.

The

following facts are contained in the proposed Pre-Trial Order:
That any alleged Counteroffer made by the Defendant was in fact
accepted through performance (P 239); that Lewis had added to the
December 4 Agreement visitation rights which rights had been orally
discussed and previously agreed to between the parties (P 253);
rhal Lewis .Jemanded in a telephone conversation that Trees provide
him wi•h •write up of their agreement on visitation (P 261); that
11 eP;

111di

<tg1-ec-,,·1c,11t
thR•

cated to Hatch that he would consider putting the oral
into writing so long as it did not cloud the Deed (262);

Milne and Trees tried at least a dozen telephone calls to
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Lewis even pleading with Lewis to tell them what he wanted relati
to a write up with his visitation rights (262); that the first t~
the parties or their agents heard of the concept or word "Counter,
was June 12, 1981 (263); that companion proposals to memorialize
the visitation rights, were mailed by Milne to Lewis or: about Jun;
At a hearing on November 12, 1982, an ORDER was entered by t!
Court wherein all correspondence between attorney Snow and Trees
was submitted to the Court in camera so that the Court could revi1
those letters which may reflect in whole or part on the relations!
of the attorney-in-fact so that the attorney-client privilege
would be preserved.

The client-attorney privilege was asserted ir

the Deposition of Snow, dated October 28, 1981, at page 4, and th
Deposition inquired only into Snow's activity as attorney-in-fact
and did not inquire into matters claimed to be within the

privil~

The matter of Snow's correspondence came before the Court based
a Motion by the attorney for Lewis.

01

The Order resulted from the

hearing on November 12, 1982, and is dated by the Court "Nunc Pro
Tune" on the 29th day of March, 1982, with the word "November"
stricken out, but the certificate shows that it was mailed on the
16th day of November, 1982.

R. Vol II p. 48.

There was never u

claim or assertion prior to trial that the Plaintiff accepted the
Counteroffer of the Defendant specifically including the Agreemen
of December 17.

However, based on the ruling of the Court, Snow

was permitted to testify what was the intention and the conversat
between him and the Plaintiff Trees relative to the claimed accep
letter of May 29.

Had that intention been disclosed by pleadings
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or µreve11ted from being disclosed by virtue of the attorney-client
relationship, the Defendant Lewis would certainly have explored the
same.
A case similar to the present one and which appears to be in
point is that of Phipps vs. Sasser, 445 P.2d P. 624 (Washington)

(1968).

The Court had before it a Motion to depose Plaintiff's

physician before trial, and Plaintiff had asserted the physicianpatient privilege.

The Court upheld the lower Court which denied

the Motion to take the Deposition.

However, the Court opined

at pages 628 and 629 the following:
We would agree that whenever it does become apparent
that the plaintiff must decide in favor of waiver, then
that waiver should not be delayed until the trial itself.
The plaintiff should not have the unfair tactical advantage
of a trial waiver which almost invariably results in a
continuance and, frequently, in the dismissal of the action
and another trial.
Certainly, at some stage in the pre-trial proceedings,
the plaintiff must decide whether he is going to call his
treating physician or physicians, and, if he is, then the
defendant is entitled to know it in time to take the depostion
of such physicians or physicians and prepare to meet their
testimony.
Our civil rules bear the same numbers as the federal
rules, which we have adopted with few changes. The federal
courts, operating under identical rules, seem to have had
little difficulty in accelerating the waiver of privilege
on a case-to-case basis without the necessity of a blanket
waiver.
This case would seem to be in league with the spirit of the
fair play and interest of justice doctrine set down by this Court
in, I_.__M. A. Financial Corporation vs. Build, Inc. 404 P.2d 670
(lltah)

(1965) wherein there had been a failure to plead an affirma-

tive defense, but the lower Court permitted the defense to be

asserted but this Court noted: " . . . If the interests of ju;;tic
so require and th€ opposing party is given a fair opportunity to
meet such a defense, the trial court may permit the issue to be
tried .

11

As is shown above, Lewis had no fair opportunity

to meet the tertimony of Snow because of the assertion of the
attorney-client relationship, the pleadings, the failure to give
any notice of such testimony although great effort was made to
obtain the same, and objection was made at the time of the waiver
the introduction of the evidence.

Justice requires that Defendu

Lewis be given the opportunity to take Snow's Deposition as to
matters heretofore hidden and covered from the Defendant so that
he may adequately prepare to meet the testimony in a New Trial.
POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF ATTORNEYS' FEES.
This point is based on the assumption for purposes of argumE
that the Court may uphold the judgment of the lower Court.
The Court granted that attorney's fee in the sum of FortyFive Thousand ($45,000.00) Dollars as a reasonable attorney's fm
However, the Plaintiff had asked for a sum double that amount.
cost of this trial and particularly attorney's fees on both side<
are enormous because of the conduct of the Plaintiff as set for~

'l

herein and particularly his change of position at trial in final
announcing that he had accepted the Counteroffer of the Plainti~

E

rather than insisting that there was a contract between the part·
had been done prior thereto and as has been set forth above.

Thi ti

w;1s

no need for the amount of work and effort put into this case

nor the waste of the Court's time.

Had the Plaintiff originally

come forth and said that he had accepted the Counteroffer, the
issues would have been very limited and quickly tried following a
short discovery.

Instead, the Plaintiff makes light of the Counter-

offer theory, until trial, and suggests that it was a figment of
the imagination of the attorney for Trees rather than looking at
the facts to which it finally conceded in claiming to have accepted
the Counteroffer.

The fee is not reasonable.

Reference is made to

DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
.JUDGMENT RE;

ATTORNEY'S FEES. R Vol. III commencing at page 235,

which further sets forth the Defendant's position without enlarging
this brief.
POINT VII
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE FIFTH SPECIAL INTERROGATORY
TO THE JURY.
The Fifth Special Interrogatory reads as follows:
S.
" We, the jury duly empanelled in the aboveentitled case, find from a preponderance of the
evidence that Exhibit 26 constituted a notice of
default as provided for in Exhibit 5, and that the
Plaintiff failed to cure or correct said default,
and therefore find in favor the Defendant, Walter
Lewis, on all issues." R. Vol II p 333.
ti

The Interrogatory was not necessary but was confusing and misleading.
(ounsto I f,Jr the Defendant, in front of the jury, stipulated that

f: Exh tbt t
t:

?()

which is the letter of June 12th wherein the Counteroffer

is w i thdrA.wn never was intended to be a notice or a compliance of

'hi the Default as provided for in Exhibit 5, the December 4th Agreement.

That had never been the position of Lewis.

Such a position wouli

have been contrary to the very existence of a counteroffer since
would have recogni.z~d that the December 4th Option Agreement was
binding contract &nd there could not have been an outstanding
counteroffer to withdraw.

The Affidavit of the Defendant's attor

in connection with the Motion for a New Trial and deals with the
circumstances surrounding the Special Interrogatory No. 5, commen
at P. 272 R. Vol. III.

Prior to the jury's leaving, Defe~dant's

counsel approached the Bench together with Plaintiff's counsel an
objected to the Interrogatory that it in affect

dire~ted

a verdic

in favor of the Plaintiff and requested that the Interrogatory no
be submitted.

Within fifteen minutes after the jury left, Defend

counsel again approached the Court together with Plaintiff's Gour.
and requested that the Court withdraw from considerati.on of Inter
rogatory No. Five.

The matter was again taken up after the jury

returned and further objection made and denied by the Court.
Vol. IV 730-735.

T

This Interrogatory could not help but confuse

the Jury for it suggested there was a contract that that Lewis'
letter of June 12 may have attempted to comply with the Default
Provision.

The Jury had to be confused and the Defendants

highly prejudiced.
SUMMARY
One might say, what is a 11 the fuss about since the Plaintii
buyer is now willing to give to Lewis everything which Lewis
requested including the visitation rights and per the December i;

Agreernenl

ln fact that attitude was pursued very heavily by the

lower Court, never on record, in exploring

settlement of this case

to lhe point that counsel for Lewis felt he was being admonished by
the Court for not pushing his client into a settlement.
p. 9, 10.

R. Vol III

AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION

FOR NEW TRIAL.

The best answer is that given by Defendant Lewis in

T, Vol III p, 643:

... Well, Milne precipitating it and Trees disclaiming any
responsibility for his agents, I told myself, 'Look, I'm too
old for the rest of my life to put up with this kind of interactivity that was always leading -- keeping me on tenderhooks.'
And I think it was at that time that I called the lawyer and
decided that I'd better go in another direction.
Defendant Lewis is still on

"tenderhooks".

This case was brought

before this Court so that the law of contracts as pertains to this
case could be firmly established to the end that Defendant would
obtain the relief to which he is entitled.
It is submitted that the Judgment and Decree of the lower
Court be reversed and Judgment be entered in favor of Defendant
Lewis, or, in the alternative, that this Court grant a new trial, a
trial that would now be short and to the point.
3~

Respectfully submitted this -2-fHl day of April, 1984.
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